CVE-2024-26877CRITICAL(9.8)
EPSS 0.7%
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: xilinx - call finalize with bh disabled
When calling crypto_finalize_request, BH should be disabled to avoid
triggering the following calltrace:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 74 at crypto/crypto_engine.c:58 crypto_finalize_request+0xa0/0x118
Modules linked in: cryptodev(O)
CPU: 2 PID: 74 Comm: firmware:zynqmp Tainted: G O 6.8.0-rc1-yocto-standard #323
Hardware name: ZynqMP ZCU102 Rev1.0 (DT)
pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : crypto_finalize_request+0xa0/0x118
lr : crypto_finalize_request+0x104/0x118
sp : ffffffc085353ce0
x29: ffffffc085353ce0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffff8808ea8688
x26: ffffffc081715038 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffff880100db00
x23: ffffff880100da80 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: ffffff8805b14000 x19: ffffff880100da80 x18: 0000000000010450
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000003 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffffff880100dad0
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffffffc0832dcd08 x9 : ffffffc0812416d8
x8 : 00000000000001f4 x7 : ffffffc0830d2830 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffffffc082091000 x4 : ffffffc082091658 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : ffffffc7f9653000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff8802d20000
Call trace:
crypto_finalize_request+0xa0/0x118
crypto_finalize_aead_request+0x18/0x30
zynqmp_handle_aes_req+0xcc/0x388
crypto_pump_work+0x168/0x2d8
kthread_worker_fn+0xfc/0x3a0
kthread+0x118/0x138
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
irq event stamp: 40
hardirqs last enabled at (39): [<ffffffc0812416f8>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x70/0xb0
hardirqs last disabled at (40): [<ffffffc08122d208>] el1_dbg+0x28/0x90
softirqs last enabled at (36): [<ffffffc080017dec>] kernel_neon_begin+0x8c/0xf0
softirqs last disabled at (34): [<ffffffc080017dc0>] kernel_neon_begin+0x60/0xf0
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
CVE-2024-26853CRITICAL(9.8)
EPSS 0.6%
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
igc: avoid returning frame twice in XDP_REDIRECT
When a frame can not be transmitted in XDP_REDIRECT
(e.g. due to a full queue), it is necessary to free
it by calling xdp_return_frame_rx_napi.
However, this is the responsibility of the caller of
the ndo_xdp_xmit (see for example bq_xmit_all in
kernel/bpf/devmap.c) and thus calling it inside
igc_xdp_xmit (which is the ndo_xdp_xmit of the igc
driver) as well will lead to memory corruption.
In fact, bq_xmit_all expects that it can return all
frames after the last successfully transmitted one.
Therefore, break for the first not transmitted frame,
but do not call xdp_return_frame_rx_napi in igc_xdp_xmit.
This is equally implemented in other Intel drivers
such as the igb.
There are two alternatives to this that were rejected:
1. Return num_frames as all the frames would have been
transmitted and release them inside igc_xdp_xmit.
While it might work technically, it is not what
the return value is meant to represent (i.e. the
number of SUCCESSFULLY transmitted packets).
2. Rework kernel/bpf/devmap.c and all drivers to
support non-consecutively dropped packets.
Besides being complex, it likely has a negative
performance impact without a significant gain
since it is anyway unlikely that the next frame
can be transmitted if the previous one was dropped.
The memory corruption can be reproduced with
the following script which leads to a kernel panic
after a few seconds. It basically generates more
traffic than a i225 NIC can transmit and pushes it
via XDP_REDIRECT from a virtual interface to the
physical interface where frames get dropped.
#!/bin/bash
INTERFACE=enp4s0
INTERFACE_IDX=`cat /sys/class/net/$INTERFACE/ifindex`
sudo ip link add dev veth1 type veth peer name veth2
sudo ip link set up $INTERFACE
sudo ip link set up veth1
sudo ip link set up veth2
cat << EOF > redirect.bpf.c
SEC("prog")
int redirect(struct xdp_md *ctx)
{
return bpf_redirect($INTERFACE_IDX, 0);
}
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
EOF
clang -O2 -g -Wall -target bpf -c redirect.bpf.c -o redirect.bpf.o
sudo ip link set veth2 xdp obj redirect.bpf.o
cat << EOF > pass.bpf.c
SEC("prog")
int pass(struct xdp_md *ctx)
{
return XDP_PASS;
}
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
EOF
clang -O2 -g -Wall -target bpf -c pass.bpf.c -o pass.bpf.o
sudo ip link set $INTERFACE xdp obj pass.bpf.o
cat << EOF > trafgen.cfg
{
/* Ethernet Header */
0xe8, 0x6a, 0x64, 0x41, 0xbf, 0x46,
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
const16(ETH_P_IP),
/* IPv4 Header */
0b01000101, 0, # IPv4 version, IHL, TOS
const16(1028), # IPv4 total length (UDP length + 20 bytes (IP header))
const16(2), # IPv4 ident
0b01000000, 0, # IPv4 flags, fragmentation off
64, # IPv4 TTL
17, # Protocol UDP
csumip(14, 33), # IPv4 checksum
/* UDP Header */
10, 0, 1, 1, # IP Src - adapt as needed
10, 0, 1, 2, # IP Dest - adapt as needed
const16(6666), # UDP Src Port
const16(6666), # UDP Dest Port
const16(1008), # UDP length (UDP header 8 bytes + payload length)
csumudp(14, 34), # UDP checksum
/* Payload */
fill('W', 1000),
}
EOF
sudo trafgen -i trafgen.cfg -b3000MB -o veth1 --cpp
CVE-2024-26856HIGH(8.8)
EPSS 0.3%
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sparx5: Fix use after free inside sparx5_del_mact_entry
Based on the static analyzis of the code it looks like when an entry
from the MAC table was removed, the entry was still used after being
freed. More precise the vid of the mac_entry was used after calling
devm_kfree on the mac_entry.
The fix consists in first using the vid of the mac_entry to delete the
entry from the HW and after that to free it.
CVE-2024-26880HIGH(7.8)
EPSS 0.7%
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm: call the resume method on internal suspend
There is this reported crash when experimenting with the lvm2 testsuite.
The list corruption is caused by the fact that the postsuspend and resume
methods were not paired correctly; there were two consecutive calls to the
origin_postsuspend function. The second call attempts to remove the
"hash_list" entry from a list, while it was already removed by the first
call.
Fix __dm_internal_resume so that it calls the preresume and resume
methods of the table's targets.
If a preresume method of some target fails, we are in a tricky situation.
We can't return an error because dm_internal_resume isn't supposed to
return errors. We can't return success, because then the "resume" and
"postsuspend" methods would not be paired correctly. So, we set the
DMF_SUSPENDED flag and we fake normal suspend - it may confuse userspace
tools, but it won't cause a kernel crash.
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:56!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 8343 Comm: dmsetup Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6 #4
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0
<snip>
RSP: 0018:ffff8881b831bcc0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: ffff888143b6eb80 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff819053d0 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffff8881b83a3400 R08: 00000000fffeffff R09: 0000000000000058
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff81a24080 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff88814538e000 R14: ffff888143bc6dc0 R15: ffffffffa02e4bb0
FS: 00000000f7c0f780(0000) GS:ffff8893f0a40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000057fb5000 CR3: 0000000143474000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die+0x2d/0x80
? do_trap+0xeb/0xf0
? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0
? do_error_trap+0x60/0x80
? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0
? exc_invalid_op+0x49/0x60
? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? table_deps+0x1b0/0x1b0 [dm_mod]
? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0
origin_postsuspend+0x1a/0x50 [dm_snapshot]
dm_table_postsuspend_targets+0x34/0x50 [dm_mod]
dm_suspend+0xd8/0xf0 [dm_mod]
dev_suspend+0x1f2/0x2f0 [dm_mod]
? table_deps+0x1b0/0x1b0 [dm_mod]
ctl_ioctl+0x300/0x5f0 [dm_mod]
dm_compat_ctl_ioctl+0x7/0x10 [dm_mod]
__x64_compat_sys_ioctl+0x104/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x184/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
RIP: 0033:0xf7e6aead
<snip>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
CVE-2024-26864HIGH(7.8)
EPSS 0.6%
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: Fix refcnt handling in __inet_hash_connect().
syzbot reported a warning in sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu().
The commit 66b60b0c8c4a ("dccp/tcp: Unhash sk from ehash for tb2 alloc
failure after check_estalblished().") tried to fix an issue that an
unconnected socket occupies an ehash entry when bhash2 allocation fails.
In such a case, we need to revert changes done by check_established(),
which does not hold refcnt when inserting socket into ehash.
So, to revert the change, we need to __sk_nulls_add_node_rcu() instead
of sk_nulls_add_node_rcu().
Otherwise, sock_put() will cause refcnt underflow and leak the socket.
[0]:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 23948 at include/net/sock.h:799 sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu+0x166/0x1a0 include/net/sock.h:799
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 23948 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6-syzkaller-00159-gc055fc00c07b #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
RIP: 0010:sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu+0x166/0x1a0 include/net/sock.h:799
Code: e8 7f 71 c6 f7 83 fb 02 7c 25 e8 35 6d c6 f7 4d 85 f6 0f 95 c0 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc e8 1b 6d c6 f7 90 <0f> 0b 90 eb b2 e8 10 6d c6 f7 4c 89 e7 be 04 00 00 00 e8 63 e7 d2
RSP: 0018:ffffc900032d7848 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffffffff89cd0035 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000040000
RDX: ffffc90004de1000 RSI: 000000000003ffff RDI: 0000000000040000
RBP: 1ffff1100439ac26 R08: ffffffff89ccffe3 R09: 1ffff1100439ac28
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100439ac29 R12: ffff888021cd6140
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88802a9bf5c0 R15: ffff888021cd6130
FS: 00007f3b823f16c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f3b823f0ff8 CR3: 000000004674a000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__inet_hash_connect+0x140f/0x20b0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:1139
dccp_v6_connect+0xcb9/0x1480 net/dccp/ipv6.c:956
__inet_stream_connect+0x262/0xf30 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:678
inet_stream_connect+0x65/0xa0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:749
__sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2048 [inline]
__sys_connect+0x2df/0x310 net/socket.c:2065
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2075 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2072 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:2072
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
RIP: 0033:0x7f3b8167dda9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f3b823f10c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3b817abf80 RCX: 00007f3b8167dda9
RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f3b823f1120 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f3b817abf80 R15: 00007ffd3beb57b8
</TASK>
CVE-2024-26890HIGH(7.8)
EPSS 0.6%
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btrtl: fix out of bounds memory access
The problem is detected by KASAN.
btrtl driver uses private hci data to store 'struct btrealtek_data'.
If btrtl driver is used with btusb, then memory for private hci data
is allocated in btusb. But no private data is allocated after hci_dev,
when btrtl is used with hci_h5.
This commit adds memory allocation for hci_h5 case.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in btrtl_initialize+0x6cc/0x958 [btrtl]
Write of size 8 at addr ffff00000f5a5748 by task kworker/u9:0/76
Hardware name: Pine64 PinePhone (1.2) (DT)
Workqueue: hci0 hci_power_on [bluetooth]
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x9c/0x128
show_stack+0x20/0x38
dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x60
print_report+0xf8/0x5d8
kasan_report+0x90/0xd0
__asan_store8+0x9c/0xc0
[btrtl]
h5_btrtl_setup+0xd0/0x2f8 [hci_uart]
h5_setup+0x50/0x80 [hci_uart]
hci_uart_setup+0xd4/0x260 [hci_uart]
hci_dev_open_sync+0x1cc/0xf68 [bluetooth]
hci_dev_do_open+0x34/0x90 [bluetooth]
hci_power_on+0xc4/0x3c8 [bluetooth]
process_one_work+0x328/0x6f0
worker_thread+0x410/0x778
kthread+0x168/0x178
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Allocated by task 53:
kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x68
kasan_save_track+0x20/0x40
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x68/0x78
__kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0xd8
__kmalloc+0x1b4/0x3b0
hci_alloc_dev_priv+0x28/0xa58 [bluetooth]
hci_uart_register_device+0x118/0x4f8 [hci_uart]
h5_serdev_probe+0xf4/0x178 [hci_uart]
serdev_drv_probe+0x54/0xa0
really_probe+0x254/0x588
__driver_probe_device+0xc4/0x210
driver_probe_device+0x64/0x160
__driver_attach_async_helper+0x88/0x158
async_run_entry_fn+0xd0/0x388
process_one_work+0x328/0x6f0
worker_thread+0x410/0x778
kthread+0x168/0x178
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x68
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb0/0x150
kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0x14/0x20
__queue_work+0x33c/0x960
queue_work_on+0x98/0xc0
hci_recv_frame+0xc8/0x1e8 [bluetooth]
h5_complete_rx_pkt+0x2c8/0x800 [hci_uart]
h5_rx_payload+0x98/0xb8 [hci_uart]
h5_recv+0x158/0x3d8 [hci_uart]
hci_uart_receive_buf+0xa0/0xe8 [hci_uart]
ttyport_receive_buf+0xac/0x178
flush_to_ldisc+0x130/0x2c8
process_one_work+0x328/0x6f0
worker_thread+0x410/0x778
kthread+0x168/0x178
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Second to last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x68
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb0/0x150
kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0x14/0x20
__queue_work+0x788/0x960
queue_work_on+0x98/0xc0
__hci_cmd_sync_sk+0x23c/0x7a0 [bluetooth]
__hci_cmd_sync+0x24/0x38 [bluetooth]
btrtl_initialize+0x760/0x958 [btrtl]
h5_btrtl_setup+0xd0/0x2f8 [hci_uart]
h5_setup+0x50/0x80 [hci_uart]
hci_uart_setup+0xd4/0x260 [hci_uart]
hci_dev_open_sync+0x1cc/0xf68 [bluetooth]
hci_dev_do_open+0x34/0x90 [bluetooth]
hci_power_on+0xc4/0x3c8 [bluetooth]
process_one_work+0x328/0x6f0
worker_thread+0x410/0x778
kthread+0x168/0x178
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
==================================================================
CVE-2024-26921HIGH(7.8)
EPSS 0.4%
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet: inet_defrag: prevent sk release while still in use
ip_local_out() and other functions can pass skb->sk as function argument.
If the skb is a fragment and reassembly happens before such function call
returns, the sk must not be released.
This affects skb fragments reassembled via netfilter or similar
modules, e.g. openvswitch or ct_act.c, when run as part of tx pipeline.
Eric Dumazet made an initial analysis of this bug. Quoting Eric:
Calling ip_defrag() in output path is also implying skb_orphan(),
which is buggy because output path relies on sk not disappearing.
A relevant old patch about the issue was :
8282f27449bf ("inet: frag: Always orphan skbs inside ip_defrag()")
[..]
net/ipv4/ip_output.c depends on skb->sk being set, and probably to an
inet socket, not an arbitrary one.
If we orphan the packet in ipvlan, then downstream things like FQ
packet scheduler will not work properly.
We need to change ip_defrag() to only use skb_orphan() when really
needed, ie whenever frag_list is going to be used.
Eric suggested to stash sk in fragment queue and made an initial patch.
However there is a problem with this:
If skb is refragmented again right after, ip_do_fragment() will copy
head->sk to the new fragments, and sets up destructor to sock_wfree.
IOW, we have no choice but to fix up sk_wmem accouting to reflect the
fully reassembled skb, else wmem will underflow.
This change moves the orphan down into the core, to last possible moment.
As ip_defrag_offset is aliased with sk_buff->sk member, we must move the
offset into the FRAG_CB, else skb->sk gets clobbered.
This allows to delay the orphaning long enough to learn if the skb has
to be queued or if the skb is completing the reasm queue.
In the former case, things work as before, skb is orphaned. This is
safe because skb gets queued/stolen and won't continue past reasm engine.
In the latter case, we will steal the skb->sk reference, reattach it to
the head skb, and fix up wmem accouting when inet_frag inflates truesize.
CVE-2024-26898HIGH(7.8)
EPSS 0.3%
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
aoe: fix the potential use-after-free problem in aoecmd_cfg_pkts
This patch is against CVE-2023-6270. The description of cve is:
A flaw was found in the ATA over Ethernet (AoE) driver in the Linux
kernel. The aoecmd_cfg_pkts() function improperly updates the refcnt on
`struct net_device`, and a use-after-free can be triggered by racing
between the free on the struct and the access through the `skbtxq`
global queue. This could lead to a denial of service condition or
potential code execution.
In aoecmd_cfg_pkts(), it always calls dev_put(ifp) when skb initial
code is finished. But the net_device ifp will still be used in
later tx()->dev_queue_xmit() in kthread. Which means that the
dev_put(ifp) should NOT be called in the success path of skb
initial code in aoecmd_cfg_pkts(). Otherwise tx() may run into
use-after-free because the net_device is freed.
This patch removed the dev_put(ifp) in the success path in
aoecmd_cfg_pkts(), and added dev_put() after skb xmit in tx().
CVE-2024-26870HIGH(7.8)
EPSS 0.3%
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4.2: fix nfs4_listxattr kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102
A call to listxattr() with a buffer size = 0 returns the actual
size of the buffer needed for a subsequent call. When size > 0,
nfs4_listxattr() does not return an error because either
generic_listxattr() or nfs4_listxattr_nfs4_label() consumes
exactly all the bytes then size is 0 when calling
nfs4_listxattr_nfs4_user() which then triggers the following
kernel BUG:
[ 99.403778] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
[ 99.404063] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
[ 99.408463] CPU: 0 PID: 3310 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.6.0-61.fc40.aarch64 #1
[ 99.415827] Call trace:
[ 99.415985] usercopy_abort+0x70/0xa0
[ 99.416227] __check_heap_object+0x134/0x158
[ 99.416505] check_heap_object+0x150/0x188
[ 99.416696] __check_object_size.part.0+0x78/0x168
[ 99.416886] __check_object_size+0x28/0x40
[ 99.417078] listxattr+0x8c/0x120
[ 99.417252] path_listxattr+0x78/0xe0
[ 99.417476] __arm64_sys_listxattr+0x28/0x40
[ 99.417723] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x100
[ 99.417929] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0
[ 99.418186] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
[ 99.418376] el0_svc+0x3c/0x110
[ 99.418554] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130
[ 99.418788] el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198
[ 99.418994] Code: aa0003e3 d000a3e0 91310000 97f49bdb (d4210000)
Issue is reproduced when generic_listxattr() returns 'system.nfs4_acl',
thus calling lisxattr() with size = 16 will trigger the bug.
Add check on nfs4_listxattr() to return ERANGE error when it is
called with size > 0 and the return value is greater than size.
CVE-2024-26852HIGH(7.8)
EPSS 0.3%
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/ipv6: avoid possible UAF in ip6_route_mpath_notify()
syzbot found another use-after-free in ip6_route_mpath_notify() [1]
Commit f7225172f25a ("net/ipv6: prevent use after free in
ip6_route_mpath_notify") was not able to fix the root cause.
We need to defer the fib6_info_release() calls after
ip6_route_mpath_notify(), in the cleanup phase.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rt6_fill_node+0x1460/0x1ac0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88809a07fc64 by task syz-executor.2/23037
CPU: 0 PID: 23037 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-01035-gea7f3cfaa588 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2e0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x167/0x540 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x142/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
rt6_fill_node+0x1460/0x1ac0
inet6_rt_notify+0x13b/0x290 net/ipv6/route.c:6184
ip6_route_mpath_notify net/ipv6/route.c:5198 [inline]
ip6_route_multipath_add net/ipv6/route.c:5404 [inline]
inet6_rtm_newroute+0x1d0f/0x2300 net/ipv6/route.c:5517
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x885/0x1040 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6597
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367
netlink_sendmsg+0xa3b/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2667
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
RIP: 0033:0x7f73dd87dda9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f73de6550c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f73dd9ac050 RCX: 00007f73dd87dda9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000140 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007f73dd8ca47a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000006e R14: 00007f73dd9ac050 R15: 00007ffdbdeb7858
</TASK>
Allocated by task 23037:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:372 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:389
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3981 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x22e/0x490 mm/slub.c:3994
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:594 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:711 [inline]
fib6_info_alloc+0x2e/0xf0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:155
ip6_route_info_create+0x445/0x12b0 net/ipv6/route.c:3758
ip6_route_multipath_add net/ipv6/route.c:5298 [inline]
inet6_rtm_newroute+0x744/0x2300 net/ipv6/route.c:5517
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x885/0x1040 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6597
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367
netlink_sendmsg+0xa3b/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2667
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
Freed by task 16:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x4e/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:640
poison_slab_object+0xa6/0xe0 m
---truncated---
CVE-2024-26907HIGH(7.8)
EPSS 0.3%
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix fortify source warning while accessing Eth segment
------------[ cut here ]------------
memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 56) of single field "eseg->inline_hdr.start" at /var/lib/dkms/mlnx-ofed-kernel/5.8/build/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c:131 (size 2)
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293779 at /var/lib/dkms/mlnx-ofed-kernel/5.8/build/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c:131 mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib]
Modules linked in: 8021q garp mrp stp llc rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) ib_core(OE) mlx5_core(OE) pci_hyperv_intf mlxdevm(OE) mlx_compat(OE) tls mlxfw(OE) psample nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink mst_pciconf(OE) knem(OE) vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_iommu_type1 vfio iommufd irqbypass cuse nfsv3 nfs fscache netfs xfrm_user xfrm_algo ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler binfmt_misc crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ghash_clmulni_intel sha512_ssse3 snd_pcsp aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd snd_pcm snd_timer joydev snd soundcore input_leds serio_raw evbug nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sch_fq_codel sunrpc drm efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 psmouse virtio_net net_failover failover floppy
[last unloaded: mlx_compat(OE)]
CPU: 0 PID: 293779 Comm: ssh Tainted: G OE 6.2.0-32-generic #32~22.04.1-Ubuntu
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib]
Code: 0c 01 00 a8 01 75 25 48 8b 75 a0 b9 02 00 00 00 48 c7 c2 10 5b fd c0 48 c7 c7 80 5b fd c0 c6 05 57 0c 03 00 01 e8 95 4d 93 da <0f> 0b 44 8b 4d b0 4c 8b 45 c8 48 8b 4d c0 e9 49 fb ff ff 41 0f b7
RSP: 0018:ffffb5b48478b570 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffb5b48478b628 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffb5b48478b5e8
R13: ffff963a3c609b5e R14: ffff9639c3fbd800 R15: ffffb5b480475a80
FS: 00007fc03b444c80(0000) GS:ffff963a3dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000556f46bdf000 CR3: 0000000006ac6003 CR4: 00000000003706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x72/0x90
? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib]
? __warn+0x8d/0x160
? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib]
? report_bug+0x1bb/0x1d0
? handle_bug+0x46/0x90
? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x80
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib]
mlx5_ib_post_send_nodrain+0xb/0x20 [mlx5_ib]
ipoib_send+0x2ec/0x770 [ib_ipoib]
ipoib_start_xmit+0x5a0/0x770 [ib_ipoib]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x8e/0x1e0
? validate_xmit_skb_list+0x4d/0x80
sch_direct_xmit+0x116/0x3a0
__dev_xmit_skb+0x1fd/0x580
__dev_queue_xmit+0x284/0x6b0
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0xe/0x50
? __flush_work.isra.0+0x20d/0x370
? push_pseudo_header+0x17/0x40 [ib_ipoib]
neigh_connected_output+0xcd/0x110
ip_finish_output2+0x179/0x480
? __smp_call_single_queue+0x61/0xa0
__ip_finish_output+0xc3/0x190
ip_finish_output+0x2e/0xf0
ip_output+0x78/0x110
? __pfx_ip_finish_output+0x10/0x10
ip_local_out+0x64/0x70
__ip_queue_xmit+0x18a/0x460
ip_queue_xmit+0x15/0x30
__tcp_transmit_skb+0x914/0x9c0
tcp_write_xmit+0x334/0x8d0
tcp_push_one+0x3c/0x60
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2e1/0xac0
tcp_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50
inet_sendmsg+0x43/0x90
sock_sendmsg+0x68/0x80
sock_write_iter+0x93/0x100
vfs_write+0x326/0x3c0
ksys_write+0xbd/0xf0
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
__x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30
do_syscall_
---truncated---
CVE-2024-26883HIGH(7.8)
EPSS 0.3%
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix stackmap overflow check on 32-bit arches
The stackmap code relies on roundup_pow_of_two() to compute the number
of hash buckets, and contains an overflow check by checking if the
resulting value is 0. However, on 32-bit arches, the roundup code itself
can overflow by doing a 32-bit left-shift of an unsigned long value,
which is undefined behaviour, so it is not guaranteed to truncate
neatly. This was triggered by syzbot on the DEVMAP_HASH type, which
contains the same check, copied from the hashtab code.
The commit in the fixes tag actually attempted to fix this, but the fix
did not account for the UB, so the fix only works on CPUs where an
overflow does result in a neat truncation to zero, which is not
guaranteed. Checking the value before rounding does not have this
problem.