CVE-2026-75595
CRITICAL(9.1)CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- CVSS 9.1 — Kritisch
Erwähnungen (letzte 60 Tage)
EPSS-Score
0.3%
Exploit-Wahrscheinlichkeit (30 Tage)
CVSS Score
9.1
Technische Schwere
Beschreibung
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Fina and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode checks the wrong offset before reading the four-byte TLS handshake header, so a ClientHello whose handshake header spans records can cause an IndexOutOfBoundsException and invoke select(ctx, null). This selects the default SslContext instead of the SNI-specific context. In deployments where per-SNI clientAuth=REQUIRE is the sole mutual TLS gate, the default SslContext uses clientAuth=NONE or clientAuth=OPTIONAL, and no application-layer certificate verification exists, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the protected route's mutual TLS requirement. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final.
Betroffene Produkte
- cpe:2.3:a:netty:netty:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:netty:netty:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
GitHub Advisories
Netty: SNI Routing Bypass via Fragmented TLS ClientHello Causing Fallback to Default SslContext
Referenzen
- https://github.com/netty/netty/commit/1b5abc6443b63726c72cdd285af2feb7ddbb8ff7
- https://github.com/netty/netty/commit/9e0519239108a69b7e9bbc5e9182ee139a0d7961
- https://github.com/netty/netty/pull/17213
- https://github.com/netty/netty/pull/17217
- https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.137.Final
- https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.17.Final
- https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-c4c3-7fpv-j4q5