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CVE-2026-106047
HIGH(7.7)CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Risk Signal Score19/100 — NIEDRIG
- CVSS 7.7 — Hoch
Erwähnungen (letzte 60 Tage)
Artikel
EPSS-Score
0.7%
Exploit-Wahrscheinlichkeit (30 Tage)
CVSS Score
7.7
Technische Schwere
Beschreibung
A Path Traversal vulnerability in the template export functionality of Ivanti Xtraction before version 2026.4 allows a remote authenticated attacker to read arbitrary files.
Erkennung & Indikatoren
Ausnutzung
In den geprüften Quellen nicht genannt
Behobene Versionen
- 2026.4
Threat-Hunting-Queries
Sentinel/Defender KQL
// This query attempts to detect unusual file access patterns that might indicate path traversal.
// It looks for attempts to access files outside of expected template directories by a web application process.
// This is a generic behavioral detection and needs to be tuned to the specific application (Ivanti Xtraction).
DeviceFileEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "xtraction.exe" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "xtraction"
| where ActionType == "FileRead" or ActionType == "FileAccessed"
| where FileName !contains "template" // Adjust based on legitimate template directory names
| where FolderPath contains "..\\" or FolderPath contains "/../" or FileName contains "..\\" or FileName contains "/../"
| summarize count() by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, FolderPath
| where count_ > 5 // Adjust threshold to reduce false positives
| project DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, FolderPath, count_Splunk SPL
# This query attempts to detect unusual file access patterns that might indicate path traversal.
# It looks for attempts to access files outside of expected template directories by a web application process.
# This is a generic behavioral detection and needs to be tuned to the specific application (Ivanti Xtraction).
index=your_windows_security_logs OR index=your_linux_audit_logs
(process_name="xtraction.exe" OR cmd_line="*xtraction*")
(action="file_read" OR action="file_access")
NOT file_path="*template*" # Adjust based on legitimate template directory names
(file_path="*..\\*" OR file_path="*/../*" OR file_name="*..\\*" OR file_name="*/../*")
| stats count by host, process_name, cmd_line, file_name, file_path
| where count > 5 # Adjust threshold to reduce false positivesSigma
title: Ivanti Xtraction Path Traversal Attempt
id: 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 # Placeholder, generate a real UUID
status: experimental
description: Detects potential path traversal attempts in Ivanti Xtraction's template export functionality.
references:
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106047
logsource:
category: process_access
product: windows
service: sysmon # Or other relevant logging source
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\xtraction.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'xtraction'
TargetFilename|contains:
- '..\'
- '/../'
# Exclude legitimate template directory access if known
# TargetFilename|not contains:
# - '\templates\'
condition: selection
fields:
- Image
- CommandLine
- TargetFilename
level: highElastic ES|QL
// This query attempts to detect unusual file access patterns that might indicate path traversal.
// It looks for attempts to access files outside of expected template directories by a web application process.
// This is a generic behavioral detection and needs to be tuned to the specific application (Ivanti Xtraction).
from filebeat-* or winlogbeat-*
| where event.category == "file"
| where process.name == "xtraction.exe" or process.command_line : "*xtraction*"
| where event.action == "access" or event.action == "read"
| where not file.path : "*template*" // Adjust based on legitimate template directory names
| where file.path : "*..\\*" or file.path : "*/../*" or file.name : "*..\\*" or file.name : "*/../*"
| stats count() by host.name, process.name, process.command_line, file.name, file.path
| where count > 5 // Adjust threshold to reduce false positives
| project host.name, process.name, process.command_line, file.name, file.path, countSecBoard-generated · behavioral · requires customization — Von SecBoard erzeugt und nicht in einer Zielumgebung validiert. Vor dem Einsatz an die eigene Protokollierung anpassen.