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CVE-2024-21351

HIGH(7.6)KEV — Aktiv ausgenutzt

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L

Risk Signal Score58/100 — HOCH
  • CVSS 7.6 — Hoch
  • EPSS 30%
  • Im CISA KEV-Katalog (aktiv ausgenutzt)

CISA KEV

Bestätigt ausgenutzt

EPSS-Score

30.3%

Exploit-Wahrscheinlichkeit (30 Tage)

CVSS Score

7.6

Technische Schwere

SecBoard-Einordnung

Security-Teams sollten umgehend alle betroffenen Windows-Systeme patchen, einschließlich Windows 10 und Windows 11 Versionen. Angesichts der aktiven Ausnutzung ist die Priorisierung dieser Patches von höchster Dringlichkeit, um das Risiko einer Kompromittierung zu minimieren. Zusätzlich sollten Monitoring-Maßnahmen verstärkt werden, um verdächtige Aktivitäten zu erkennen, die auf eine Ausnutzung hindeuten könnten.

KI-gestützte Einordnung auf Basis der NVD-Daten.

Beschreibung

Windows SmartScreen Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability

Erkennung & Indikatoren

Ausnutzung

Actively exploited in the wild (CISA KEV).

Threat-Hunting-Queries

This is a security feature bypass vulnerability allowing code injection and execution. Detection should focus on unusual process creation, especially from untrusted sources or processes not typically associated with code execution, bypassing SmartScreen.

Sentinel/Defender KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe" or InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "msedge.exe" or InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "chrome.exe" // Or other browsers/applications that might trigger SmartScreen
| where ProcessCommandLine contains ".exe" or ProcessCommandLine contains ".dll" // Looking for execution
| where not (InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel in ("System", "High")) // Exclude highly privileged processes that might legitimately bypass SmartScreen
| where not (FolderPath contains "Program Files" or FolderPath contains "Windows") // Exclude common legitimate paths
| where ReportId in ( // Example: Look for events where SmartScreen might have been bypassed
    DeviceEvents
    | where ActionType == "SmartScreenBypass" or ActionType == "SmartScreenSkipped" // Placeholder for actual SmartScreen bypass events if available
    | distinct ReportId
)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessParentFileName

Splunk SPL

index=windows_events (sourcetype=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational EventCode=1) OR (sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4688)
| eval ParentProcessName=case(EventCode=1, ParentImage, EventCode=4688, ParentProcessName)
| eval ProcessName=case(EventCode=1, Image, EventCode=4688, NewProcessName)
| eval CommandLine=case(EventCode=1, CommandLine, EventCode=4688, CommandLine)
| where (ParentProcessName="explorer.exe" OR ParentProcessName="msedge.exe" OR ParentProcessName="chrome.exe")
| where (CommandLine LIKE "%.exe%" OR CommandLine LIKE "%.dll%")
| where NOT (ProcessName IN ("svchost.exe", "csrss.exe", "wininit.exe", "lsass.exe")) // Exclude common system processes
| where NOT (ProcessPath LIKE "%Program Files%" OR ProcessPath LIKE "%Windows%")
| table _time, host, ParentProcessName, ProcessName, CommandLine, ProcessPath

Sigma

title: Windows SmartScreen Bypass Attempt
author: SecBoard Operations
date: 2024/07/25
modified: 2024/07/25
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\explorer.exe'
      - '\msedge.exe'
      - '\chrome.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '.exe'
      - '.dll'
  filter_legit:
    Image|contains:
      - '\Program Files\'
      - '\Windows\'
    ParentImage|contains:
      - '\Program Files\'
      - '\Windows\'
  condition: selection and not filter_legit
fields:
  - CommandLine
  - ParentImage
  - Image
  - User
level: high

Elastic ES|QL

from process where event.type == "start" and 
  (process.parent.executable.name == "explorer.exe" or 
   process.parent.executable.name == "msedge.exe" or 
   process.parent.executable.name == "chrome.exe") and 
  (process.command_line : "*.exe" or process.command_line : "*.dll") and 
  not (process.executable.path : "C:\\Program Files\\*" or 
       process.executable.path : "C:\\Windows\\*")
| select @timestamp, host.name, process.parent.executable.name, process.executable.name, process.command_line, process.executable.path

SecBoard-generated · behavioral · requires customizationVon SecBoard erzeugt und nicht in einer Zielumgebung validiert. Vor dem Einsatz an die eigene Protokollierung anpassen.

Betroffene Produkte

  • cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10_1507:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10_1607:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10_1809:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10_21h2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10_22h2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_11_21h2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_11_22h2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_11_23h2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2016:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2019:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2022:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2022_23h2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Referenzen